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•  What	  is	  regulated	  post-­‐GFC	  
•  The	  diverging	  approaches	  of	  UK	  and	  US	  
reforms	  
•  The	  changed/enhanced	  role	  of	  public	  
actors	  and	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  defeat	  of	  
private	  law	  approaches	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
What	  is	  Regulated	  
•  Systemic	  Risk	  
•  Big	  ﬁnancial	  insStuSons	  called	  Systemically	  
Important	  Financial	  InsStuSons	  (SIFIs)	  or	  (if	  acSve	  in	  
cross-­‐border/internaSonal	  arena)	  Globally	  
systemically	  Important	  Financial	  insStuSons	  (G-­‐SIFIs),	  
essenSally	  too-­‐big-­‐to-­‐fail	  ﬁnancial	  insStuSons	  	  
•  Non-­‐SIFI	  ﬁnancial	  insStuSons	  
•  OTC	  DerivaSves	  
•  Shadow	  Banking	  
•  I	  do	  not	  deal	  with	  OTC	  derivaSves	  and	  shadow	  
banking	  in	  this	  presentaSon	  
Emilios	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Systemic	  risk	  
•  1st	  deﬁniSon:	  systemic	  risk	  is	  the	  risk	  that	  can	  potenSally	  
cause	  instability	  for	  large	  parts	  of	  the	  ﬁnancial	  system,	  which	  
individual	  ﬁrms	  could	  not	  protect	  themselves	  against	  
•  2nd	  deﬁniSon:	  systemic	  risk	  is	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  reﬂects	  the	  
sense	  of	  a	  ‘broad-­‐based	  breakdown’	  in	  ﬁnancial	  system	  
•  A	  strong	  systemic	  event	  that	  inﬂuences	  a	  number	  of	  
insStuSons	  and	  consequently	  impairs	  the	  well-­‐funcSoning	  of	  
ﬁnancial	  system	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  systemic	  crisis.	  
•  At	  the	  heart	  of	  systemic	  events	  lies	  contagion	  	  
•  Thus,	  a	  strong	  systemic	  event	  may	  relate	  to	  aggregate	  
ﬂuctuaSons	  of	  credit	  (e.g.,	  lending	  booms),	  contagion	  and	  joint	  
crashes	  in	  securiSes	  markets	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
Systemic	  Risk	  Regula<on	  
•  Changed	  approach	  to	  regulaSon	   	  
	  -­‐	  macro	  pruden,al	  
	  -­‐	  Structural	  reform	  
	  -­‐	  New	  Bank	  resolu,on	  regimes	  	  
	  -­‐	  New	  Capital	  and	  Liquidity	  Regula,ons	  
	  -­‐	  Reform	  of	  OTC	  markets	  
•  Changed	  approach	  to	  supervision	  
	  -­‐	  reform	  of	  regulatory	   	  
	  structures	  




Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
The	  Financial	  Cycle	  
•  There	  are	  cyclical	  pa`erns	  in	  leverage	  (the	  leverage	  cycle)	  and	  
maturity	  mismatch	  posiSons	  in	  the	  ﬁnancial	  system	  which	  betray	  a	  
credit	  and	  liquidity	  cycle	  
•  This	  means	  that,	  in	  good	  Smes,	  ﬁnancial	  agents	  tend	  to	  
underesSmate	  risk	  and,	  subsequently,	  overinvest.	  This	  
overinvestment	  is	  fuelled	  by	  credit.	  The	  credit	  cycle	  is	  in	  its	  upward	  
swing.	  In	  bad	  Smes,	  the	  reverse	  happens:	  agents	  become	  more	  risk	  
averse	  and	  reluctant	  to	  invest.	  In	  the	  extreme,	  this	  may	  
accumulate	  in	  a	  credit	  crunch.	  
•  Most	  ﬁnancial	  crises	  were	  preceded	  by	  a	  credit	  boom	  
•  Namely,	  Financial	  imbalances	  -­‐	  in	  the	  form	  of	  credit	  and	  liquidity	  
cycles	  –	  which	  might	  be	  building	  up	  in	  the	  boom	  period	  can	  
subsequently	  do	  serious	  damage	  to	  the	  economy	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
The	  Financial	  Instability	  Hypothesis	  	  
•  The	  noSon	  of	  ﬁnancial	  imbalances	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  
Minsky’s	  ﬁnancial	  instability	  hypothesis	  (Minsky,	  1982).	  	  
•  Minsky	  idenSﬁes	  three	  disSnct	  income–debt	  relaSonships	  
for	  economic	  actors/units,	  which	  he	  deﬁned	  as	  hedge,	  
speculaSve,	  and	  Ponzi	  ﬁnance	  stages.	  	  
•  Market	  actors/units	  using	  hedge	  ﬁnance	  are	  those	  ‘which	  
can	  fulﬁll	  all	  of	  their	  contractual	  payment	  obligaSons	  by	  
their	  cash	  ﬂows’.	  	  
•  SpeculaSve	  ﬁnance	  units	  are	  economic	  units	  that	  can	  meet	  
their	  payment	  commitments	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  liabiliSes,	  
even	  though	  they	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  repay	  the	  principal	  
out	  of	  income	  cash	  ﬂows.	  	  
•  In	  the	  case	  of	  Ponzi	  units,	  cash	  ﬂows	  from	  operaSons	  are	  
not	  suﬃcient	  to	  fulﬁll	  either	  the	  repayment	  of	  principal	  or	  
the	  interest	  due	  on	  outstanding	  debts	  
•  	  Thus,	  a	  Ponzi	  ﬁnance	  unit	  gradually	  becomes	  highly	  
leveraged.	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Financial	  Instability	  Hypothesis	  
•  What	  follows,	  as	  Minsky	  notes,	  is	  that	  the	  economy	  has	  
ﬁnancing	  regimes	  under	  which	  it	  is	  stable,	  and	  ﬁnancing	  
regimes	  under	  which	  it	  is	  unstable.	  	  
•  Moreover,	  over	  periods	  of	  prolonged	  prosperity,	  the	  economy	  
transits	  from	  ﬁnancial	  relaSons	  that	  make	  for	  a	  stable	  system	  
to	  ﬁnancial	  relaSons	  that	  make	  for	  an	  unstable	  system.	  	  
•  Accordingly,	  periods	  of	  protracted	  speculaSve	  euphoria	  
(bubbles)	  lead	  to	  accumulaSon	  of	  debts	  that	  exceed	  what	  
borrowers	  can	  repay	  from	  their	  income	  leading	  to	  a	  ﬁnancial	  
crisis.	  	  
•  As	  lenders	  reduce	  the	  ﬂows	  of	  credit	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  
a(ermath	  of	  over-­‐lending,	  they	  indiscriminately	  raSon	  credit,	  
leading	  an	  economy	  into	  recession,	  a	  condiSon	  that	  in	  the	  last	  
crisis	  was	  widely	  described	  as	  a	  ‘credit	  crunch’.	  
•  	  The	  gradual	  movement	  of	  the	  ﬁnancial	  system	  from	  stability	  to	  
crisis	  is	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  ‘Minsky	  moment’.	  	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
Building	  up	  debt/leverage	  in	  the	  US	  ﬁnancial	  sector	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Examples	  of	  <me-­‐variable	  macro-­‐pruden<al	  	  
instruments	  	  
	  •  the	  Counter-­‐cyclical	  buﬀer	  of	  Basel	  III	  –	  	  
	  Premised	  	  on	  a	  credit	  to	  GDP	  growth	  raSo	  
	  Aimed	  to	  make	  the	  system	  rather	  individual	  
	  insStuSons	  more	  resilient	  and	  thus	  applied	  on	  a	  
	  system-­‐wide	  basis	  	  
•  maximum	  	  	  to	  value	  (LtV)	  and	  loan	  to	  income	  (LtI)	  
raSos	  
•  Time-­‐varying	  leverage	  raSos	  
•  In	  many	  ways	  credit-­‐gap	  (i.e.,	  credit	  to	  deposits)	  
growth	  models	  and	  property	  prices	  are	  held	  to	  be	  the	  
more	  reliable	  indicators	  of	  a	  ﬁnancial	  cycle	  that	  is	  
longer	  than	  the	  business	  or	  the	  economic	  cycle	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
But	  can	  it	  be	  eﬀec<ve?	  (i)	  
•  Can	  ﬁnancials	  cycle	  be	  predicted	  and	  are	  the	  indicators	  
used	  the	  right	  indicators?	  –	  some	  indicators	  predict	  the	  
last	  cycle	  
•  Macro-­‐prudenSal	  policies	  are	  predominantly	  naSonal	  
and	  their	  impact	  will	  be	  limited	  if	  domesSc	  credit	  ﬂows	  
can	  be	  subsStuted	  by	  cross-­‐border	  ﬂows,	  esp.	  with	  
respect	  to	  transacSons	  that	  rely	  more	  on	  the	  global	  
capital	  markets,	  such	  as	  securiSzaSons,	  and	  less	  on	  
domesSc	  lending	  (e.g.,	  mortgages)	  
•  In	  addiSon,	  in	  highly	  integrated	  markets	  the	  potenSal	  for	  
spillover	  eﬀects	  is	  massive	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  credit	  
expansion,	  credit	  contracSon	  and	  conﬁdence	  in	  the	  
ﬁnancial	  system	  (e.g.,	  the	  Spanish	  banking	  crisis)	  
•  Therefore,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  a	  level	  of	  coordinaSon	  that	  
is	  much	  higher	  than	  anything	  experienced	  so	  far	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Can	  it	  be	  Eﬀec<ve?	  (ii)	  
•  The	  regime	  is	  more	  eﬀecSve	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  inﬂuencing	  
ﬁnancial	  sector	  behaviour	  than	  business	  and	  household	  
behaviour	  
•  Thus,	  the	  present	  instruments	  will	  prove	  weak	  to	  smooth	  
the	  ﬁnancial	  cycle,	  if	  not	  per	  se,	  because	  
•  They	  will	  create	  a	  border	  problem,	  business	  and	  
households	  might	  looks	  elsewhere	  for	  credit,	  but	  the	  policy	  
will	  have	  limited	  impact	  on	  ﬂows	  from	  the	  shadow	  banking	  
sector	  
•  	  Financial	  sector	  feedback	  loops	  	  as	  sources	  of	  endogenous	  
risk	  have	  to	  be	  understood	  be`er	  and	  it	  is	  doubjul	  if	  they	  
can	  be	  predicted	  with	  accuracy	  as	  they	  also	  involve	  the	  X	  
factor	  of	  panic/agents’	  irraSonal	  risk	  aversion	  and	  
wholesale	  runs	  
•  Macro-­‐models	  have	  to	  improve	  especially	  as	  regards	  credit	  
supply	  fricSon,	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  leverage	  cycle	  and	  
liquidity	  risks	  
	   Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
SIFIs	  &	  G-­‐SIFIs	  
•  New	  regula<ons	  –	  	  
•  Structural	  Reform	  
•  Capital	  adequacy	  standards:	  equally	  applicable	  to	  non-­‐SIFIs	  
•  New	  liquidity	  requirements	  –	  equally	  applicable	  to	  non-­‐SIFIs	  
•  G-­‐SIFIs	  (super-­‐charge):	  ‘a	  progressive	  Common	  Equity	  Tier	  1	  
(CET1)	  capital	  requirement	  ranging	  from	  1%	  to	  2.5%,	  
depending	  on	  a	  bank's	  systemic	  importance.	  To	  provide	  a	  
disincenSve	  for	  banks	  facing	  the	  highest	  charge	  to	  increase	  
materially	  their	  global	  systemic	  importance	  in	  the	  future,	  an	  
addiSonal	  1%	  loss	  absorbency	  would	  be	  applied	  in	  such	  
circumstances.’	  (Basel	  Commi`ee,	  2011)	  	  
•  Living	  Wills	  
•  ConverSble	  Capital	  Instruments	  (CoCos)	  
•  New	  ResoluSon	  Regimes	  to	  ensure	  resolvability	  and	  prevent	  
further	  bailouts	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	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The	  role	  of	  the	  G20	  and	  of	  the	  FSB	  in	  
Iden<fying	  and	  regula<ng	  G-­‐SIFIs	  
•  DesignaSon	  of	  Global	  SIFIs	  is	  an	  internaSonal	  eﬀort	  due	  to	  
their	  contribuSon	  to	  cross-­‐border	  contagion:	  
–  On	   November	   4,	   2011,	   the	   G20	   Finance	   Ministers	   and	   Central	  
Bank	   Governors,	   through	   the	   Financial	   Stability	   Board	   (FSB),	  
published	  the	  names	  of	  an	   iniSal	  group	  of	  29	  banks	  determined	  
to	  be	  “global	  
	  systemically	  important	  ﬁnancial	  insStuSons”	  (G-­‐SIFIs)	  
–  At	  the	  same	  Sme,	  the	  FSB	  released	  an	  “integrated	  set”	  of	  policy	  
measures	  to	  address	  the	  risks	  to	  the	  global	  ﬁnancial	  system	  from	  
G-­‐SIFIs	  Among	  these	  policy	  measures	  was	  a	  publicaSon	  of	  the	  
Basel	  Commi`ee	  on	  Banking	  Supervision	  which	  established	  an	  
assessment	  methodology	  featuring	  an	  “indicator-­‐based	  
measurement	  approach”	  for	  evaluaSng	  systemic	  risk	  that	  
weights	  both	  categories	  	  
–  Accepted	  	  indicators	  are	  Size,	  subsStutability,	  
interconnectedness,	  cross-­‐jurisdicSonal	  acSvity,	  and	  complexity.	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UK	  &	  US	  Bank	  Regula<on	  &	  Supervision	  
•  	  Supervision	  -­‐	  
–  New	  Supervisory	  Structures:	  
•  US:	  Financial	  Stability	  Oversight	  Council	  (FSOC)	  +	  
•  Federal	  Reserve	  Board	  (FRB)	  +	  	  
•  extensive	  powers	  to	  FDIC	  
•  UK:	  (MacroprudenSal)	  Financial	  Policy	  Commi`ee	  (BoE)	  +	  	  
•  a	  microprudenSal	  regulator	  (the	  PrudenSal	  RegulaSon	  Authority	  –	  
BoE)	  covers	  also	  non-­‐SIFIs+	  	  
•  a	  conduct	  regulator	  the	  Financial	  Conduct	  Authority	  (FCA)	  
–  Closer	  supervision	  by	  means	  of	  stress	  tests,	  etc.	  
•  Strengthened	  corporate	  governance	  and	  increased	  
responsibility	  for	  bank	  directors	  (can	  it	  be	  eﬀec<ve?)	  
•  Structural	  Reform	  
•  Recovery	  and	  Resolu<on	  Plans	  (Living	  wills)	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
Structure	  of	  SIFI	  Supervision-­‐	  USA	  	  
•  Financial	  Stability	  Oversight	  Council	  
•  Title	  I	  of	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act,	  the	  Financial	  Stability	  Act	  of	  2010,	  
created	  the	  Financial	  Stability	  Oversight	  Council	  )	  (FSOC).	  	  
•  The	  FSOC	  was	  created	  to:	  
•  IdenSfy	  risks	  to	  US	  ﬁnancial	  stability	  that	  could	  arise	  from:	  	  
–  the	  material	  ﬁnancial	  distress	  or	  failure,	  or	  ongoing	  acSviSes	  
of	  large	  interconnected	  	  bank	  holding	  companies	  (BHCs)	  or	  
non-­‐bank	  ﬁnancial	  companies;	  or	  
–  outside	  the	  ﬁnancial	  services	  marketplace.	  
•  Promote	  market	  discipline	  by	  eliminaSng	  expectaSons	  that	  the	  
federal	  government	  will	  shield	  them	  from	  losses	  in	  the	  event	  of	  
failure.	  
•  Respond	  to	  emerging	  threats	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  US	  ﬁnancial	  
system.	   Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
Repor<ng	  to	  the	  FSOC	  
•  The	  Act	  provides	  that	  the	  FSOC	  may	  request	  or	  require	  a	  variety	  of	  reports.	  In	  
parScular,	  the	  FSOC	  may,	  acSng	  through	  the	  OFR:	  
•  Request	  periodic	  or	  other	  reports	  from	  any	  non-­‐bank	  ﬁnancial	  company	  or	  
BHC	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  assessing	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  ﬁnancial	  acSvity	  or	  
ﬁnancial	  market	  in	  which	  the	  company	  parScipates,	  or	  the	  company	  itself,	  
poses	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  ﬁnancial	  stability	  of	  the	  US.	  
•  Require	  an	  SSFI,	  and	  any	  subsidiary	  of	  the	  SSFI,	  to	  submit	  cerSﬁed	  reports	  to	  
keep	  the	  FSOC	  informed	  on	  the:	  
–  ﬁnancial	  condiSon	  of	  the	  company;	  	  
–  systems	  for	  monitoring	  and	  controlling	  ﬁnancial,	  operaSng,	  and	  other	  
risks;	  
–  transacSons	  with	  any	  subsidiary	  that	  is	  a	  depository	  ins;tu;on;	  and	  
–  extent	  to	  which	  the	  acSviSes	  and	  operaSons	  of	  the	  company	  and	  any	  
subsidiary	  of	  that	  company,	  could,	  under	  adverse	  circumstances,	  have	  the	  
potenSal	  to	  disrupt	  ﬁnancial	  markets	  or	  aﬀect	  the	  overall	  ﬁnancial	  
stability	  of	  the	  US.	  
Emilios	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What	  Does	  the	  FSOC	  Do?	  
	  •  Under	  the	  Act,	  the	  FSOC:	  •  Must	  monitor	  the	  marketplace	  to	  idenSfy	  potenSal	  threats	  to	  US	  ﬁnancial	  stability.	  
•  Must	  monitor	  domesSc	  and	  internaSonal	  ﬁnancial	  regulatory	  proposals	  and	  developments,	  
including	  insurance	  and	  accounSng	  issues,	  and	  advise	  Congress	  and	  make	  recommendaSons	  
in	  those	  areas	  that	  will	  enhance	  the	  integrity,	  eﬃciency,	  compeSSveness	  and	  stability	  of	  the	  
US	  ﬁnancial	  markets.	  
•  Must	  make	  recommendaSons	  to	  primary	  ﬁnancial	  regulatory	  agencies	  to	  apply	  new	  or	  
heightened	  standards	  and	  safeguards	  for	  ﬁnancial	  acSviSes	  or	  pracSces	  that	  could	  create	  or	  
increase	  risks	  of	  signiﬁcant	  liquidity,	  credit	  or	  other	  problems	  spreading	  among	  BHCs,	  non-­‐
bank	  ﬁnancial	  companies	  and	  US	  ﬁnancial	  markets.	  
•  Must	  idenSfy	  regulatory	  gaps	  that	  could	  pose	  a	  risk	  to	  US	  ﬁnancial	  stability.	  
•  Must	  require	  the	  FRB	  to	  supervise	  non-­‐bank	  ﬁnancial	  companies	  that	  may	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  
US	  ﬁnancial	  stability	  in	  the	  event	  of	  their	  ﬁnancial	  distress	  or	  failure.	  
•  Must	  make	  recommendaSons	  to	  the	  FRB	  concerning	  the	  sesng	  of	  standards	  and	  reporSng	  
and	  disclosure	  requirements	  applicable	  to	  SSFIs.	  RecommendaSons	  may	  include:	  	  
–  risk-­‐based	  capital	  requirements;	  
–  leverage	  limits;	  
–  liquidity	  requirements;	  
–  resoluSon	  plan	  and	  credit	  exposure	  report	  requirements;	  and	  
–  short-­‐term	  debt	  limits.	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	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More	  than	  macro-­‐pruden<al	  regulator?	  
•  Examples	  of	  acSons	  the	  FSOC	  has	  taken	  since	  its	  incepSon	  
include:	  	  
•  On	  January	  18,	  2011,	  issuing	  a	  study	  and	  recommendaSons	  
on	  implemenSng	  the	  Volcker	  Rule	  and	  on	  concentraSon	  
limits	  on	  large	  ﬁnancial	  companies	  and	  
•  On	  July	  18,	  2011,	  issuing	  ﬁnal	  rules	  outlining	  the	  protocol	  
for	  its	  designaSon	  of	  ﬁnancial	  market	  uSliSes	  as	  
systemically	  important	  	  
•  On	  October	  11,	  2011,	  issuing	  a	  second	  noSce	  of	  proposed	  
rulemaking	  on	  the	  designaSon	  of	  systemically	  signiﬁcant	  
ﬁnancial	  insStuSons	  under	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act	  	  
•  On	  April	  3,	  2012,	  approving	  a	  ﬁnal	  rule	  and	  interpreSve	  
guidance	  on	  the	  FSOC's	  authority	  to	  designate	  nonbank	  
ﬁnancial	  companies	  as	  SSFIs	  subject	  to	  enhanced	  regulaSon	  
and	  oversight	  	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
FSOC	  Membership	  
•  The	  FSOC	  consists	  of	  15	  members:	  ten	  voSng	  and	  ﬁve	  non-­‐voSng.	  	  
•  The	  ten	  voSng	  members	  are	  the	  Treasury	  Secretary,	  as	  Chairperson	  of	  the	  FSOC,	  an	  
insurance	  expert	  appointed	  by	  the	  President	  and	  conﬁrmed	  by	  the	  US	  Senate,	  and	  the	  heads	  
of	  the:	  
	  Federal	  Reserve	  Board	  (FRB).	  
	  Oﬃce	  of	  Comptroller	  of	  the	  Currency	  (OCC).	  
	  Federal	  Deposit	  Insurance	  Corpora;on	  	  (FDIC).	  
	  Securi;es	  Exchange	  Commission	  	  (SEC).	  
	  Commodi;es	  Futures	  Trading	  Commission	  (CFTC).	  
	  Federal	  Housing	  Finance	  Agency.	  
	  NaSonal	  Credit	  Union	  AdministraSon.	  
	  Consumer	  Financial	  Protec;on	  Bureau)	  (CFPB).	  	  
•  The	  ﬁve	  non-­‐voSng	  members	  of	  the	  FSOC	  are:	  
	  The	  director	  of	  the	  Oﬃce	  of	  Financial	  Research	  (OFR).	  	  
	  The	  director	  of	  the	  Federal	  Insurance	  Oﬃce	  (FIO).	  	  
	  A	  state	  insurance	  regulator	  by	  state	  insurance	  regulators.	  
	  A	  state	  banking	  supervisor	  chosen	  by	  state	  banking	  supervisors.	  
	  A	  state	  securiSes	  commissioner	  chosen	  based	  by	  state	  securiSes	  commissioners.	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
	  
FSOC	  Vo<ng	  
	  •  Except	  where	  speciﬁed	  in	  the	  Act,	  decisions	  of	  
the	  FSOC	  are	  to	  be	  made	  by	  majority	  vote,	  with	  
each	  member	  of	  the	  FSOC	  having	  one	  vote.	  
However,	  in	  certain	  cases,	  the	  Treasury	  Secretary	  
as	  Chairperson	  has	  greater	  rights.	  For	  example:	  
•  Although	  a	  two-­‐thirds	  supermajority	  vote	  is	  
required	  to	  designate	  a	  non-­‐bank	  ﬁnancial	  
company	  as	  a	  systemically	  signiﬁcant	  ﬁnancial	  
ins;tu;on	  (SSFI)	  and	  requiring	  enhanced	  
prudenSal	  supervision,	  the	  Treasury	  Secretary	  
must	  vote	  in	  favour	  of	  that	  designaSon.	  
•  The	  Treasury	  Secretary	  can	  exclude	  non-­‐voSng	  
members	  from	  the	  FSOC's	  deliberaSons	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	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The	  Role	  of	  the	  FRB	  
	  •  The	  authority	  of	  the	  FRB	  has	  been	  considerably	  expanded	  under	  the	  Act.	  In	  
addiSon	  to	  its	  role	  on	  the	  FSOC,	  the	  FRB	  now	  has	  regulatory	  authority	  over	  
enSSes	  historically	  outside	  its	  purview	  such	  as	  holding	  companies.	  
•  En<<es	  Under	  the	  Supervision	  of	  the	  FRB	  
•  Regulatory	  authority	  granted	  to	  the	  FRB	  under	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Act	  to	  
supervise,	  among	  others:	  BHCs	  and	  state	  chartered	  banks	  that	  have	  elected	  
to	  join	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  System	  	  	  
•  In	  addiSon,	  the	  FRB	  now	  has:	  
•  Regulatory	  authority	  over	  SSFIs	  	  
•  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  eliminaSon	  of	  the	  Oﬃce	  of	  ThriG	  Supervision	  	  (OTS),	  
supervisory	  and	  rule-­‐making	  authority	  over	  thri(	  holding	  companies	  and	  
their	  non-­‐depositary	  insStuSon	  subsidiaries.	  
•  In	  addiSon,	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  requires	  that	  the	  US	  Government	  Accountability	  
Oﬃce	  (GAO)	  publish	  a	  report	  on	  the	  eﬀect	  of	  removing	  certain	  exempSons	  
from	  the	  deﬁniSon	  of	  the	  term	  "bank"	  under	  the	  Bank	  Holding	  Company	  Act	  
of	  1956	  (BHC	  Act).	  These	  include	  exempSons	  for	  credit	  card	  banks,	  industrial	  
loan	  companies	  and	  thri(s.	  Removal	  of	  these	  exempSons	  would	  subject	  the	  
parent	  holding	  companies	  to	  regulaSon	  by	  the	  FRB	  as	  bank	  holding	  
companies.	  On	  January	  19,	  2012,	  the	  GAO	  issued	  that	  report,	  but	  made	  no	  
strong	  recommendaSons	  on	  whether	  to	  remove	  the	  exempSons	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
FRB’s	  Regulatory	  Authority	  
Under	  the	  Act,	  the	  FRB's	  regulatory	  obligaSons	  include:	  
•  Considering	  the	  recommendaSons	  made	  by	  the	  FSOC	  for	  
heightened	  or	  enhanced	  prudenSal	  standards	  for	  SSFIs	  and	  
any	  other	  companies	  that	  the	  FSOC	  has	  idenSﬁed	  as	  requiring	  
greater	  supervision	  because	  of,	  among	  other	  things,	  their	  size	  
and	  riskiness.	  
•  ConsulSng	  with	  the	  relevant	  FSOC	  member	  before	  imposing	  
prudenSal	  standards	  that	  may	  have	  a	  "signiﬁcant	  impact"	  on	  
a	  subsidiary	  of	  a	  SSFI	  that	  is	  regulated	  by	  that	  FSOC	  member.	  
Reviewing	  and	  approving	  SSFIs'	  resoluSon	  plans	  ("living	  
wills").	  
•  ConducSng	  stress	  tests	  of	  SSFIs.	  	  
Emilios	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Emergency	  Lending	  Authority	  
	  •  The	  Act	  modiﬁes	  SecSon	  13(3)	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Act	  to	  
provide	  that	  the	  FRB	  may	  only	  authorize	  a	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  to	  
provide	  ﬁnancial	  assistance	  to	  failing	  insStuSons	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
program	  or	  facility	  "with	  broad-­‐based	  eligibility."	  A	  program	  does	  
not	  have	  broad-­‐based	  eligibility	  if	  it	  is	  structured	  to	  remove	  assets	  
from	  a	  single	  and	  speciﬁc	  company's	  balance	  sheet	  ,	  or	  if	  it	  is	  
created	  to	  assist	  a	  single	  and	  speciﬁc	  company	  in	  avoiding	  
bankruptcy,	  resoluSon	  by	  the	  FDIC	  or	  any	  other	  insolvency	  
proceeding.	  	  
•  The	  FRB	  must,	  in	  consultaSon	  with	  the	  Treasury	  Secretary,	  adopt	  
policies	  and	  procedures	  governing	  emergency	  lending	  designed	  to	  
ensure	  that	  any	  lending	  provided	  by	  the	  FRB	  and	  the	  Federal	  
Reserve	  Banks	  provides	  liquidity	  to	  the	  ﬁnancial	  system	  and	  not	  to	  
aid	  a	  single	  and	  speciﬁc	  failing	  ﬁnancial	  insStuSon.	  
•  This	  provision	  is	  aimed	  at	  avoiding	  the	  ﬁnancial	  assistance	  that	  was	  
given	  to	  CiSgroup,	  Bank	  of	  America,	  AIG	  and	  other	  ﬁnancial	  
insStuSons	  during	  the	  ﬁnancial	  crisis.	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The	  Expanded	  Supervisory	  Role	  of	  the	  FDIC	  
•  The	  authority	  of	  the	  FDIC	  has	  been	  considerably	  expanded	  under	  
the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act:	  
•  Ii	  is	  a	  voSng	  member	  of	  the	  FSOC.	  
•  Must	  approve	  living	  wills	  of	  SSFIs	  required	  to	  be	  submi`ed	  under	  
the	  Act.	  
•  May	  be	  appointed	  as	  receiver	  of	  any	  ﬁnancial	  company	  if	  certain	  
condiSons	  are	  met.	  	  
•  Must	  consult	  with	  the	  FRB	  to	  set	  requirements	  for	  early	  
remediaSon	  of	  a	  ﬁnancial	  company	  in	  ﬁnancial	  distress.	  These	  
requirements	  include,	  for	  companies:	  
–  in	  the	  iniSal	  stages	  of	  ﬁnancial	  decline,	  limits	  on	  capital	  distribuSons,	  
acquisiSons	  and	  asset	  growth;	  and	  
–  in	  the	  later	  stages	  of	  ﬁnancial	  decline,	  a	  capital	  restoraSon	  plan,	  
capital	  raising	  requirements,	  limits	  on	  transacSons	  with	  aﬃliates,	  
management	  changes	  and	  asset	  sales.	  
In	  addiSon	  to	  its	  role	  on	  the	  FSOC,	  the	  Act	  gives	  the	  FDIC	  supervisory	  (but	  
not	  rule-­‐making)	  authority	  over	  state	  chartered	  thri(s	  	  
Finally,	  the	  FDIC	  has	  the	  right	  to	  liquidate	  or	  resolve	  failing	  ﬁnancial	  
companies	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
US	  Regula<on	  of	  SIFIs	  
•  An	  insStuSon	  that	  could	  be	  designated	  systemically	  signiﬁcant	  
pursuant	  to	  SecSon	  113	  Dodd	  Frank	  Act	  includes	  any	  US	  or	  
Foreign	  company	  that	  is,	  ‘predominantly	  engaged	  in	  ﬁnancial	  
acSviSes,’	  other	  than	  a	  foreign	  banking	  organizaSon	  that	  is	  
treated	  as	  a	  bank	  holding	  company	  in	  the	  USA,	  a	  bank	  holding	  
company,	  and	  certain	  other	  types	  of	  enSSes	  subject	  to	  bank	  
or	  bank-­‐like	  regulaSon.	  
•  FSOC	  ﬁnal	  rule,	  which	  was	  approved	  in	  April	  2012.	  This	  gives	  
the	  FSOC	  the	  power	  to	  designate	  certain	  ﬁnancial	  insStuSons	  
as	  systemically	  important.	  This	  is	  achieved	  quanStaSvely	  by	  
size,	  but	  the	  FSOC	  sSll	  retains	  substanSal	  discreSon.	  US	  ﬁrms	  
are	  considered	  on	  a	  global	  basis,	  whereas,	  foreign	  ﬁrms	  will	  
only	  be	  judged	  by	  their	  US	  assets	  and	  liabiliSes.	  If	  the	  FSOC	  
deems	  that	  a	  ﬁrm	  is	  not	  able	  to	  meet	  its	  requirements	  then	  it	  
can	  decide	  to	  label	  a	  company	  as	  a	  non-­‐bank	  Systemically	  
Important	  Financial	  InsStuSon	  (SIFI).	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US	  Regula<on	  &	  	  
Supervision	  of	  SIFIs	  –	  Living	  wills	  
•  On	  October	  17,	  2011,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  approved	  a	  ﬁnal	  joint	  rule	  
implemenSng	  the	  requirement	  of	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act	  that	  SIFIs	  
periodically	  report	  “the	  plan	  of	  such	  company	  for	  rapid	  and	  orderly	  
resoluSon	  in	  the	  event	  of	  material	  ﬁnancial	  distress	  or	  failure”	  to	  the	  
Federal	  Reserve,	  the	  FDIC	  and	  the	  Council.	  
•  Pursuant	  to	  the	  rule,	  designaSon	  of	  a	  ﬁnancial	  insStuSon	  as	  a	  SIFI	  ha	  
signiﬁcant	  consequences	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  ﬁnancial	  insStuSon’s	  planning	  
and	  preparaSon	  for	  potenSal	  ﬁnancial	  distress	  or	  insolvency.	  	  
•  The	  insStuSon	  will	  be	  required	  to	  prepare	  a	  so-­‐called	  “living	  will,”	  or	  
conSngency	  plan,	  for	  resolving	  its	  aﬀairs	  under	  the	  U.S.	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  
in	  the	  event	  that	  it	  experiences	  material	  ﬁnancial	  distress.	  
•  	  If	  the	  insStuSon	  is	  in	  danger	  of	  becoming	  insolvent,	  the	  FDIC	  may	  be	  
appointed	  receiver	  pursuant	  to	  the	  Orderly	  LiquidaSon	  Authority	  
contained	  in	  ArScle	  II	  of	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act.66	  In	  such	  case,	  the	  Secretary	  
of	  the	  Treasury	  will	  use	  the	  insStuSon’s	  “living	  will”	  to	  determine	  whether	  
resoluSon	  of	  the	  insStuSon’s	  aﬀairs	  is	  best	  achieved	  under	  the	  Bankruptcy	  
Code	  or	  the	  Orderly	  LiquidaSon	  Authority.	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STRUCTURAL	  REFORMS	  UK-­‐US	  
•  VOLCKER	  RULE	  prohibits	  banks	  from:	  
•  	  “1)	  engaging	  in	  proprietary	  trading”	  	  
•  “2)	  acquir[ing]	  or	  retain[ing]	  any	  equity,	  
partnership,	  or	  other	  ownership	  interest	  in	  or	  
sponsor[ing]	  a	  hedge	  fund	  or	  a	  private	  equity	  
fund.”	  
•  	  The	  regulatory	  implementaSon	  of	  the	  Volcker	  
Rule,	  however,	  has	  been	  signiﬁcantly	  weakened	  
by	  numerous	  excepSons	  and	  variances	  •	  SIZE	  
LIMITATIONS:	  Cap	  on	  assets/liabiliSes	  (Dodd-­‐
Frank	  cap	  very	  lax)	  
•  STRUCTURAL	  REFORMS	  –	  	  UK’s	  ring-­‐fencing	  
Emilios	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Ban	  on	  Proprietary	  Trading	  
•  “Proprietary	  trading”	  is	  deﬁned	  as	  “engaging	  as	  a	  principal	  for	  the	  trading	  
account	  of	  the	  banking	  enSty	  or	  [relevant]	  nonbank	  ﬁnancial	  company	  .	  .	  .	  
in	  any	  transacSon	  to	  purchase	  or	  sell,	  or	  otherwise	  acquire	  or	  dispose	  of,	  
any	  security,	  any	  derivaSve,	  any	  contract	  of	  sale	  of	  a	  commodity	  for	  future	  
delivery,	  any	  opSon	  on	  any	  such	  security,	  derivaSve,	  or	  contract,	  or	  any	  
other	  security	  or	  ﬁnancial	  instrument	  that	  the	  appropriate	  Federal	  
agencies	  .	  .	  .	  determine	  [by	  rule].”	  12	  U.S.C.	  §1851(h)(4).	  	  
•  “Trading	  account”	  primarily	  refers	  short-­‐term	  trades,	  though	  federal	  
regulators	  could	  expand	  that	  coverage.	  12	  U.S.C.	  §1851(h)(6).	  	  
•  ExcepSons:	  trading	  is	  permi`ed	  “in	  connecSon	  with	  underwriSng	  or	  
market-­‐making,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  either	  does	  not	  exceed	  near	  term	  
demands	  of	  clients,	  customers,	  or	  counterparSes;	  on	  behalf	  of	  customers;	  
or	  by	  an	  insurance	  business	  for	  the	  general	  account	  of	  the	  insurance	  
company.”	  (12	  U.S.C.	  §1851(a)(1),	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Wall	  Street	  Reform	  and	  
Consumer	  ProtecSon	  Act).	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Ban	  to	  trade	  in	  or	  sponsor	  	  
shadow	  banking	  en<<es	  
•  SecSon	  (§	  619),	  the	  "Volcker	  Rule,”	  prohibits	  any	  banking	  enSty,	  including	  aﬃliates	  of	  banks,	  
from:	  
•  •	  (i)	  sponsoring,	  or	  invesSng	  in,	  a	  hedge	  fund,	  private	  equity	  fund,	  and	  potenSally	  numerous	  
other	  types	  of	  privately	  oﬀered	  funds	  and	  pooled	  investment	  vehicles,	  including	  venture	  
capital	  funds,	  real	  estate	  funds,	  structured	  ﬁnance	  vehicles	  and	  some	  types	  of	  special	  
purpose	  vehicles	  used	  in	  project	  ﬁnance	  transacSons,	  
•  except	  for	  funds	  that	  are	  organized	  or	  oﬀered	  by	  the	  banking	  en<ty,	  subject	  to:	  
•  (a)	  the	  banking	  enSty	  owning	  no	  more	  than	  3%	  of	  the	  fund;	  
•  (b)	  an	  overall	  limit	  of	  3%	  of	  the	  banking	  enSty's	  Tier	  1	  capital	  invested	  in	  private	  funds;	  and	  
•  (c)	  other	  limitaSons,	  including	  as	  to	  the	  name	  of	  the	  fund,	  and	  aﬃliated	  transacSons.	  
•  In	  addiSon,	  the	  banking	  enSty	  may	  make	  seed	  investments	  in	  a	  fund,	  including	  owning	  100%	  
of	  afund,	  for	  up	  to	  one	  year.	  
•  •	  Other	  RestricSons.	  Any	  banking	  enSty	  that	  sponsors	  a	  private	  fund,	  any	  banking	  enSty	  that	  
acts	  solely	  as	  an	  investment	  adviser	  to	  a	  private	  fund	  (even	  if	  it	  does	  not	  otherwise	  sponsor	  
the	  fund),	  and	  any	  aﬃliate	  may	  not	  enter	  into	  a	  transacSon	  with	  such	  fund	  that	  would	  be	  a	  
"covered	  transacSon"	  as	  deﬁned	  under	  Federal	  Reserve	  Act	  SecSon	  23A,	  and	  is	  also	  subject	  
to	  SecSon	  23B,	  except	  that	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  may	  allow	  prime	  brokerage	  transacSons	  if	  
certain	  requirements	  are	  met.	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
UK’s	  Ring-­‐fencing	  Approach	  
Vickers	  Report	  and	  	  
the	  Financial	  Services	  Act	  2013	  	  
•  In	  June	  2010,	  the	  UK	  established	  an	  Independent	  Commission	  on	  Banking	  to	  
consider	  structural	  and	  non-­‐structural	  reforms	  to	  the	  UK	  banking	  sector	  to	  
promote	  ﬁnancial	  stability	  and	  compeSSon.	  
•  	  Chaired	  by	  Sir	  John	  Vickers,	  the	  Commission	  published	  its	  ﬁnal	  report	  (widely	  
known	  as	  the	  Vickers	  Report)	  in	  September	  2011.	  
•  The	  goals	  of	  the	  Commission	  were	  threefold:	  to	  “reduce	  the	  probability	  and	  
impact	  of	  systemic	  ﬁnancial	  crises”;	  to	  “maintain	  the	  eﬃcient	  ﬂow	  of	  credit	  to	  the	  
real	  economy”;	  and	  to	  “preserve	  the	  funcSon	  of	  the	  payments	  system	  and	  
guaranteed	  capital	  certainty	  and	  liquidity	  for	  small	  savers.”	  
•  	  To	  meet	  these	  goals,	  the	  Vickers	  Report	  recommended	  a	  combinaSon	  of	  
structural	  reform	  and	  “enhanced	  loss-­‐absorbing	  capacity.”	  
•  Ring-­‐Fencing:	  Banks	  would	  be	  required	  to	  take	  deposits	  from,	  and	  provide	  
overdra(s	  to,	  those	  individuals	  and	  enterprises	  through	  separate	  subsidiaries	  that	  
could	  not	  engage	  in	  ac<vi<es	  that	  might	  expose	  them	  to	  loss,	  such	  as	  trading	  
book	  ac<vi<es,	  purchasing	  loans	  or	  securi<es,	  and	  deriva<ves	  trading.	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The	  ‘Height	  of	  the	  Fence’	  
•  The	  Vickers	  Report	  also	  made	  recommendaSons	  about	  
what	  it	  called	  the	  “height”	  of	  fence:	  	  
•  It	  recommended	  recommendaSon	  that	  each	  ring-­‐
fenced	  subsidiary	  should	  be	  a	  separate	  legal	  enSty	  that	  
adheres	  to	  strict	  arm’s	  length	  formaliSes	  appears	  to	  
provide	  a	  measure	  of	  bankruptcy	  remoteness.	  
•  This	  means	  that	  each	  ring-­‐fenced	  subsidiary	  should	  
meet	  certain	  regulatory	  requirements	  for	  capital,	  
liquidity,	  and	  funding	  appears	  to	  enable	  such	  
subsidiary	  to	  operate,	  if	  needed,	  on	  a	  standalone	  basis.	  
•  Each	  ring-­‐fenced	  subsidiary	  should	  only	  engage	  in	  
arm’s	  length	  transacSons	  with	  aﬃliates	  and	  should	  
have	  a	  majority	  of	  its	  directors,	  including	  the	  chair,	  be	  
independent	  to	  preserve	  the	  subsidiary’s	  business	  and	  
assets	  from	  cross-­‐group	  exposures.	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The	  Post-­‐2009	  UK	  Bank	  Resolu<on	  Regime	  
•  Post-­‐	  Northern	  Rock	  rescue	  it	  became	  commonplace	  belief	  that	  banks	  are	  special	  enSSes	  to	  
which	  the	  applicaSon	  of	  general	  insolvency	  law	  in	  the	  event	  of	  failure	  does	  more	  harm	  than	  
good	  and	  they	  should	  be	  subjected	  to	  special	  resoluSon	  laws.	  To	  this	  eﬀect	  the	  UK	  adopted	  a	  
Special	  ResoluSon	  Regime	  (SRR)	  following	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  2009	  Banking	  Act	  (now	  
amended),	  which	  gives	  the	  UK	  authoriSes	  a	  permanent	  framework	  providing	  tools	  for	  
dealing	  with	  failing	  UK	  banks	  and	  building	  socieSes.	  It	  gave	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  a	  key	  role	  in	  
implemenSng	  a	  resoluSon	  using	  the	  statutory	  resoluSon	  tools.	  The	  SRR	  powers	  are	  carried	  
out	  by	  the	  Special	  ResoluSon	  Unit	  which	  leads	  in	  the	  work	  required	  to	  select	  and	  implement	  
a	  resoluSon	  tool.	  	  
•  	  In	  descending	  order,	  the	  Banking	  2009	  Act	  gives	  the	  government	  three	  "stabilisaSon	  
opSons"	  with	  respect	  to	  seriously	  troubled	  banks.	  The	  ﬁrst	  opSon	  is	  to	  ﬁnd	  a	  private	  sector	  
purchaser	  for	  the	  bank's	  shares	  or	  property.	  It	  includes	  the	  power	  to	  eﬀect	  share	  or	  property	  
transfers	  by	  order.	  The	  second	  opSon	  is	  to	  transfer	  the	  bank's	  business	  (but	  not	  its	  shares)	  to	  
a	  government	  owned	  bridge	  bank,	  which	  will	  hopefully	  oﬀ-­‐load	  that	  business	  to	  the	  private	  
sector	  within	  a	  year.	  The	  third	  stabilisaSon	  opSon	  is	  to	  place	  the	  bank's	  shares	  into	  
"temporary	  public	  ownership"	  (the	  Act's	  euphemism	  for	  naSonalisaSon),	  although	  the	  Act	  
sets	  no	  deadline	  for	  ending	  that	  arrangement.	  In	  pracScal	  terms,	  all	  three	  opSons	  were	  
available	  under	  the	  2008	  Act,	  although	  the	  2009	  Act	  contains	  new	  language	  ("temporary")	  
and	  new	  mechanisms	  ("bridge	  bank").	  AcSon	  under	  the	  ﬁrst	  two	  opSons	  can	  be	  limited	  to	  
speciﬁc	  parts	  of	  the	  bank.	  That	  would	  enable	  the	  UK	  government	  to	  implement	  a	  TARP	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The	  UK’s	  SRR	  
•  In	  2009	  the	  UK	  Treasury	  had	  an	  "Asset	  ProtecSon	  Scheme"	  which	  was	  not	  
Sed	  to	  the	  banking	  sector	  but	  sSll	  borne	  similariSes	  to	  TARP.	  
•  The	  far-­‐reaching	  powers	  given	  under	  the	  Act	  are	  to	  be	  exercised	  in	  the	  
public	  interest,	  whose	  principal	  criterion	  was	  the	  avoidance	  of	  a	  serious	  
threat	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  UK	  ﬁnancial	  system.	  
•  The	  2009	  Act's	  three	  stabilisaSon	  opSons	  can	  be	  exercised	  unless	  the	  
relevant	  bank	  has	  either	  breached	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  breach	  minimum	  
regulatory	  requirements	  as	  to	  capital	  adequacy	  or	  prudenSal	  
management.	  
•  The	  further	  requirements	  in	  the	  case	  of	  either	  of	  the	  ﬁrst	  two	  opSons	  are	  
that	  government	  intervenSon	  is	  needed	  to	  protect	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  
"the	  stability	  of	  the	  ﬁnancial	  systems	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  ...	  the	  
maintenance	  of	  public	  conﬁdence	  in	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  banking	  systems	  
of	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  or	  ...	  the	  protecSon	  of	  depositors".	  
•  The	  2009	  Act's	  objecSves	  also	  talk	  of	  stability	  and	  public	  conﬁdence,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  protecSon	  of	  depositors'	  and	  public	  funds	  and,	  curiously,	  the	  
avoidance	  of	  a	  contravenSon	  of	  the	  HRA's	  protecSon	  of	  property	  rights.	  
None	  of	  those	  objecSves	  is	  ranked.	  Treasury	  has	  issued	  a	  Code	  of	  PracSce	  
to	  give	  further	  guidance.	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THE	  US	  BANK	  RESOLUTION	  REGIME	  SOME	  HISTORY	  
•  Most	  of	  the	  historical	  literature	  concerning	  the	  New	  Deal	  banking	  reforms	  concentrates	  on	  
the	  so-­‐called	  Glass-­‐Steagall	  Act,	  which	  was	  in	  fact	  only	  part	  of	  the	  Banking	  Act	  1933.	  
Variously	  praised	  and	  condemned,	  that	  part	  quaranSned	  investment	  banking	  from	  
commercial	  banking,	  on	  the	  theory	  that	  tradiSonal	  banking	  should	  not	  chase	  the	  high-­‐risk	  
proﬁts	  of	  investment	  banking.	  The	  same	  Act	  introduced	  the	  FDIC,	  whose	  success	  is	  not	  as	  
contested.	  	  
•  Perhaps	  more	  interesSng	  than	  Roosevelt's	  laws	  were	  his	  assumpSons	  of	  power	  to	  declare	  
new	  (and	  temporary)	  law	  as	  the	  Commander	  in	  Chief.	  
•  He	  summoned	  an	  emergency	  session	  of	  Congress	  within	  the	  ﬁrst	  fortnight	  of	  his	  presidency,	  
to	  pass	  the	  Emergency	  Banking	  Act	  1933	  (US).	  The	  speed	  with	  which	  the	  Bill	  became	  law	  was	  
astonishing.	  No	  printed	  copies	  were	  available,	  and	  members	  had	  to	  listen	  to	  the	  Clerk's	  
reading	  of	  it	  and	  then	  pass	  it	  immediately.	  They	  also	  had	  to	  approve	  a	  resoluSon	  "raSfying"	  
Roosevelt's	  emergency	  declaraSons.	  All	  of	  these	  measures	  were	  announced	  in	  the	  language	  
of	  "war",	  and	  some	  of	  them	  were	  presented	  as	  if	  they	  were	  a	  simple	  extension	  of	  a	  1917	  Act	  
concerned	  with	  enemy	  property	  (although	  the	  full	  name	  of	  the	  old	  Act	  was	  air-­‐brushed	  out).	  
Roosevelt's	  declaraSons	  and	  his	  new	  emergency	  Act	  were	  obviously	  arbitrary,	  and	  in	  some	  
respects,	  appalling.	  His	  appropriaSon	  of	  the	  language	  of	  war	  set	  a	  precedent	  for	  claims	  by	  
subsequent	  Presidents	  for	  unquesSoning	  obedience	  to	  emergency	  measures.	  
•  	  But	  by	  the	  Sme	  that	  serious	  challenges	  were	  to	  reach	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  government	  by	  
the	  President	  had	  so(ened	  into	  government	  by	  regulatory	  agencies,	  which	  la`er	  style	  the	  
court	  eventually	  upheld.	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
THE	  US	  RESOLUTION	  REGIME	  FOR	  SIFIs	  
•  Orderly	  Liquida<on	  Authority	  
•  Title	  II	  of	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act	  sets	  out	  a	  new	  process	  for	  handling	  the	  insolvency	  and	  liquida;on	  
of	  qualifying	  ﬁnancial	  companies	  and	  their	  subsidiaries.	  Under	  the	  Act,	  the	  Treasury	  Secretary	  
has	  the	  authority	  to	  appoint	  the	  Federal	  Deposit	  Insurance	  Corpora;on	  (FDIC)	  as	  receiver	  of	  
these	  companies	  if	  certain	  condiSons	  are	  met.	  The	  FDIC's	  resoluSon	  and	  receivership	  authority	  is	  
modelled	  on	  the	  Federal	  Deposit	  Insurance	  Act	  (	  (FDI	  Act)	  with	  some	  elements	  from	  the	  
Bankruptcy	  Code.	  There	  are	  meaningful	  diﬀerences,	  however,	  between	  these	  laws	  and	  the	  
orderly	  liquidaSon	  authority	  set	  out	  in	  Title	  II	  of	  the	  Act.	  Although	  the	  FDIC	  has	  some	  of	  the	  same	  
authority	  and	  powers	  to	  resolve	  qualifying	  ﬁnancial	  insStuSons	  as	  it	  does	  under	  the	  FDI	  Act	  to	  
resolve	  depository	  ins;tu;ons	  ),	  some	  of	  its	  broad	  powers	  under	  the	  FDI	  Act	  have	  been	  modiﬁed	  
for	  the	  purposes	  of	  resolving	  ﬁnancial	  companies.	  In	  addiSon,	  whereas	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  is	  
generally	  designed	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  creditors	  Title	  II	  is	  dra(ed	  to	  minimize	  the	  eﬀects	  
of	  the	  company's	  failure	  on	  the	  US	  ﬁnancial	  system	  and	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  US	  Treasury.	  It	  is	  
also	  intended	  to	  address	  concerns	  of	  moral	  hazard.	  
•  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  FDIC's	  resoluSon	  authority	  over	  ﬁnancial	  companies	  is	  to:	  
•  Eliminate	  taxpayer	  bailouts	  of	  companies	  that	  have	  historically	  been	  considered	  "too	  big	  to	  fail."	  
•  Ensure	  that	  the	  failed	  companies'	  stockholders,	  creditors	  and	  other	  counterparSes	  bear	  the	  risk	  
of	  these	  companies'	  failure.	  
•  Provide	  an	  orderly	  and	  raSonal	  mechanism	  for	  liquidaSng	  and	  resolving	  systemically	  signiﬁcant	  
ﬁnancial	  ins;tu;ons	  (SSFIs)	  and	  other	  ﬁnancial	  companies	  whose	  liquidaSon	  may	  have	  an	  
adverse	  impact	  on	  US	  ﬁnancial	  stability	  and	  that	  cannot	  appropriately	  be	  handled	  under	  another	  
applicable	  law	  (for	  example,	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code).	  Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
Scope	  of	  OLA	  
•  Companies	  Subject	  to	  the	  FDIC's	  Resolu<on	  Authority	  
•  UnSl	  the	  Act's	  passage,	  the	  insolvency	  of	  ﬁnancial	  insStuSons	  was	  conducted	  in	  the	  case	  of:	  
•  Insured	  depository	  ins;tu;ons	  by	  the	  FDIC	  under	  the	  FDI	  Act.	  These	  insStuSons	  will	  sSll	  be	  
resolved	  under	  the	  FDI	  Act.	  	  
•  Insurance	  companies,	  by	  the	  relevant	  state	  authoriSes	  under	  that	  state's	  laws.	  
•  Broker-­‐dealers	  (by	  the	  SecuriSes	  Investor	  ProtecSon	  CorporaSon	  (SIPC)	  under	  the	  SecuriSes	  
Investor	  ProtecSon	  Act	  of	  1970	  (SIPA).	  
•  Other	  ﬁnancial	  companies,	  by	  a	  bankruptcy	  court	  under	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code.	  
•  Under	  the	  Act,	  the	  FDIC's	  authority	  may	  be	  invoked	  for	  the	  resoluSon	  of	  any	  ﬁnancial	  company	  if	  
certain	  condiSons	  are	  met.	  For	  purposes	  of	  Title	  II,	  ﬁnancial	  company	  is	  deﬁned	  as	  any	  company	  
incorporated	  or	  organized	  under	  Federal	  law	  or	  any	  US	  state	  that	  is	  a:	  
•  Bank	  holding	  company	  	  (BHC).	  
•  Non-­‐bank	  SSFI.	  
•  Company	  predominantly	  engaged	  in	  acSviSes	  that	  are	  ﬁnancial	  in	  nature	  or	  incidental	  thereto	  for	  
purposes	  of	  SecSon	  4(k)	  of	  the	  Bank	  Holding	  Company	  Act	  (BHCA).	  
•  Subsidiary	  of	  any	  of	  the	  companies	  described	  above	  that	  is	  predominantly	  engaged	  in	  acSviSes	  that	  
are	  ﬁnancial	  in	  nature	  or	  incidental	  thereto	  for	  purposes	  of	  SecSon	  4(k)	  of	  the	  BHCA	  other	  than	  an	  
insured	  depository	  insStuSon	  or	  insurance	  company.	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Treasury	  Secretary	  Determina<on	  	  
	  •  Once	  it	  has	  received	  the	  recommendaSon	  of	  the	  FRB	  and	  the	  FDIC	  (or	  the	  SEC	  or	  the	  director	  of	  the	  FIO,	  as	  applicable),	  the	  Treasury	  Secretary,	  in	  consultaSon	  with	  the	  President,	  may	  determine	  that	  the	  appointment	  of	  
the	  FDIC	  as	  receiver	  of	  the	  ﬁnancial	  company	  is	  warranted	  if	  it	  ﬁnds	  that	  the	  following	  condiSons	  are	  met:	  
•  The	  ﬁnancial	  company	  is	  in	  default	  or	  in	  danger	  of	  default.	  	  
•  The	  failure	  of	  the	  ﬁnancial	  company	  and	  its	  resoluSon	  under	  another	  law	  (for	  example,	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  or	  
the	  applicable	  state	  law)	  would	  have	  serious	  adverse	  eﬀects	  on	  ﬁnancial	  stability	  in	  the	  US.	  
•  No	  viable	  private	  sector	  alternaSve	  is	  available	  to	  prevent	  the	  default	  of	  the	  ﬁnancial	  company.	  
•  Any	  eﬀect	  on	  the	  claims	  or	  interests	  of	  the	  ﬁnancial	  company's	  creditors,	  counterparSes	  and	  stockholders	  and	  
other	  market	  parScipants	  as	  a	  result	  of	  acSons	  to	  be	  taken	  by	  the	  FDIC	  is	  appropriate,	  given	  the	  impact	  that	  
any	  acSon	  under	  Title	  II	  would	  have	  on	  US	  ﬁnancial	  stability.	  
•  LiquidaSon	  by	  the	  FDIC	  would	  avoid	  or	  miSgate	  the	  serious	  adverse	  eﬀects	  on	  ﬁnancial	  stability	  in	  the	  US,	  
taking	  into	  account	  the	  eﬀecSveness	  of	  the	  acSon	  in	  miSgaSng	  the:	  	  
–  potenSal	  adverse	  eﬀects	  on	  the	  ﬁnancial	  system;	  	  
–  cost	  to	  the	  US	  Treasury;	  and	  
–  the	  potenSal	  to	  increase	  excessive	  risk	  taking	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  ﬁnancial	  company's	  creditors,	  
counterparSes	  and	  stockholders.	  
•  A	  federal	  agency	  has	  ordered	  the	  ﬁnancial	  company	  to	  convert	  all	  of	  its	  converSble	  debt	  instruments	  to	  equity.	  
•  The	  company	  meets	  the	  deﬁniSon	  of	  a	  ﬁnancial	  company.	  	  
•  A	  ﬁnancial	  company	  that	  the	  Treasury	  Secretary	  has	  determined	  the	  appointment	  of	  the	  FDIC	  as	  its	  receiver	  is	  
warranted	  is	  known	  as	  a	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company.	  
•  No	  later	  than	  24	  hours	  a(er	  making	  this	  determinaSon,	  the	  Treasury	  Secretary	  must	  noSfy	  Congressional	  
leaders	  of	  this	  determinaSon	  and	  the	  basis	  for	  its	  determinaSon.	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Safeguards	  
•  Judicial	  Review	  of	  Covered	  Financial	  Company	  Designa<on	  
•  If	  the	  Treasury	  Secretary	  determines	  that	  a	  ﬁnancial	  company	  is	  a	  covered	  
ﬁnancial	  company	  and	  the	  FDIC	  should	  be	  appointed	  as	  receiver,	  the	  ﬁnancial	  
company	  has	  the	  opSon	  to	  consent	  to	  the	  appointment.	  If	  it	  does	  not	  consent	  to	  
the	  appointment,	  the	  Treasury	  Secretary	  must	  peSSon	  the	  US	  District	  Court	  of	  the	  
District	  of	  Columbia	  (DC	  District	  Court)	  for	  an	  order	  authorizing	  the	  appointment.	  	  
•  In	  reaching	  a	  decision	  as	  to	  whether	  this	  order	  should	  be	  granted,	  the	  DC	  District	  
Court	  must	  determine	  that	  the	  Treasury	  Secretary's	  determinaSon	  was	  not	  
"arbitrary	  and	  capricious"	  in	  its	  determinaSon	  that	  the	  company	  is:	  
•  A	  ﬁnancial	  company	  under	  the	  relevant	  Stle	  of	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act.	  
•  In	  default	  or	  in	  danger	  of	  default.	  
•  The	  DC	  District	  Court	  must	  rule	  on	  the	  Treasury	  Secretary's	  peSSon	  within	  24	  
hours.	  If	  it	  does	  not,	  the	  order	  is	  automaScally	  granted.	  The	  aﬀected	  company	  may	  
appeal	  the	  decision	  to	  the	  US	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  for	  the	  District	  of	  Columbia	  and	  
then	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  on	  an	  expedited	  basis	  but	  any	  appeal	  does	  not	  stay	  the	  
receivership	  proceedings.	  
•  Related	  Rulemaking	  Developments	  
•  On	  March	  15,	  2011,	  the	  FDIC	  issued	  a	  proposed	  rule	  that	  would	  clarify	  whether	  a	  
company	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  predominantly	  engaged	  in	  ﬁnancial	  acSviSes	  for	  
purposes	  of	  the	  FDIC's	  resoluSon	  authority	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FDIC’s	  Role	  
•  FDIC	  Appointment	  
•  Once	  appointed,	  the	  FDIC's	  receivership	  stays	  in	  place	  for	  three	  years	  but	  
may	  be	  extended	  for	  two	  addiSonal	  one	  year	  terms	  to	  complete	  any	  
ongoing	  liSgaSon	  or	  other	  proceeding.	  
•  In	  its	  capacity	  as	  receiver,	  the	  FDIC	  must	  liquidate	  the	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  
company	  and	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  minimizes	  risks	  to	  US	  ﬁnancial	  stability	  and	  
moral	  hazard	  so	  that:	  
•  Its	  creditors	  and	  stockholders	  bear	  the	  company's	  losses.	  
•  Management	  responsible	  for	  the	  company's	  condiSon	  is	  not	  retained.	  
•  The	  FDIC	  and	  other	  federal	  agencies	  take	  all	  steps	  necessary	  and	  
appropriate	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  parSes	  having	  responsibility	  for	  the	  
company'	  condiSon	  (for	  example,	  directors	  and	  oﬃcers)	  bear	  losses	  
consistent	  with	  their	  responsibility,	  including	  acSons	  for	  damages,	  
resStuSon	  and	  recoupment	  of	  compensaSon.	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Eﬀect	  of	  FDIC	  appointment	  
•  Eﬀect	  of	  Appointment	  
•  The	  authority	  of	  the	  FDIC	  concerning	  a	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  authority	  
it	  has	  over	  insured	  depository	  insStuSons	  under	  the	  FDI	  Act.	  Once	  the	  FDIC	  is	  appointed	  as	  
receiver,	  the:	  
•  FDIC	  succeeds	  to	  all	  of	  the	  rights,	  privileges,	  Stles	  and	  powers	  of	  the	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  
company,	  its	  stockholders,	  directors	  and	  oﬃcers	  and	  has	  the	  right	  to	  take	  all	  acSons	  
necessary	  to	  liquidate	  the	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company:	  
–  organizing	  a	  bridge	  ﬁnancial	  company	  to	  which	  assets	  of	  the	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company	  
may	  be	  transferred;	  and	  
–  merging	  the	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company	  or	  transferring	  its	  assets	  or	  liabiliSes	  to	  another	  
company	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  company's	  directors	  or	  stockholders	  or	  any	  other	  
federal	  agency.	  
•  Bankruptcy	  Code	  no	  longer	  applies.	  
•  Covered	  ﬁnancial	  company	  must	  be	  liquidated.	  
•  The	  FDIC's	  rights	  under	  the	  Act	  are	  diﬀerent	  from	  insolvency	  or	  bankruptcy	  proceedings	  
under	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  where	  the:	  
•  Insolvent	  company's	  board	  and	  oﬃcers	  usually	  remain	  in	  control	  of	  the	  company	  and	  have	  
decision-­‐making	  authority	  over	  the	  company	  and	  its	  operaSons,	  subject	  to	  the	  restricSons	  of	  
the	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  and	  bankruptcy	  judge.	  
•  Company	  usually	  retains	  possession	  of	  its	  assets.	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Scope	  of	  FDIC's	  Authority	  
	  •  In	  taking	  any	  acSon	  to	  resolve	  the	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company,	  the	  FDIC	  must:	  
•  Determine	  that	  taking	  acSon	  is	  necessary	  for	  purposes	  of	  the	  ﬁnancial	  stability	  of	  the	  
US	  and	  not	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  preserving	  the	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company.	  	  
•  Ensure	  the	  stockholders	  of	  the	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company	  do	  not	  receive	  payment	  
unSl	  a(er	  all	  other	  claims	  and	  the	  Orderly	  LiquidaSon	  Fund	  are	  fully	  paid	  
•  Ensure	  that	  unsecured	  creditors	  bear	  losses	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  priority	  of	  claim	  
provisions.	  
•  Ensure	  removal	  of	  management	  responsible	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  
company	  condiSon.	  
•  Ensure	  that	  the	  members	  of	  the	  board	  of	  directors	  responsible	  for	  the	  failed	  
condiSon	  of	  the	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company	  are	  removed,	  if	  those	  members	  have	  not	  
already	  been	  removed	  at	  the	  Sme	  the	  FDIC	  is	  appointed	  as	  receiver.	  
•  Not	  take	  an	  equity	  interest	  in,	  or	  become	  a	  stockholder	  of,	  any	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  
company	  or	  any	  covered	  subsidiary.	  
•  The	  Act	  also	  includes	  a	  new	  mechanism	  for	  the	  FDIC	  to	  address	  derivaSves	  contracts	  
to	  which	  the	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company	  is	  a	  party.	  For	  more	  informaSon	  on	  these	  
contracts	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Scope	  of	  FDIC’s	  Authority	  
•  Subsidiaries	  of	  a	  Financial	  Company	  
•  If	  the	  FDIC	  is	  appointed	  as	  receiver	  of	  a	  ﬁnancial	  
company,	  it	  may	  also	  appoint	  itself	  as	  receiver	  of	  
a	  US	  subsidiary	  of	  that	  company	  if	  the	  FDIC	  
together	  with	  the	  Treasury	  Secretary	  determine	  
that	  this	  appointment	  is	  required	  because	  the:	  
•  Subsidiary	  is	  in	  default	  or	  in	  danger	  of	  default.	  
•  Appointment	  would	  avoid	  or	  miSgate	  the	  eﬀects	  
of	  the	  subsidiary's	  failure	  and	  liquidaSon	  on	  the	  
US	  ﬁnancial	  system.	  
•  Appointment	  would	  facilitate	  the	  orderly	  
liquidaSon	  of	  the	  company.	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Implementa<on	  
•  On	  October	  12,	  2010,	  as	  an	  iniSal	  step	  in	  implemenSng	  the	  FDIC's	  resoluSon	  
authority,	  the	  FDIC	  issued	  a	  proposed	  rule	  outlining	  its	  treatment	  of	  creditor	  
claims	  when	  appointed	  receiver	  of	  a	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company	  	  
•  On	  January	  18,	  2011,	  the	  FDIC	  announced	  an	  interim	  ﬁnal	  rule	  clarifying	  its	  
treatment	  of	  certain	  creditor	  claims	  under	  its	  orderly	  liquidaSon;	  it	  also	  issued	  a	  
general	  counsel's	  	  
•  On	  March	  15,	  2011,	  the	  FDIC	  issued	  a	  proposed	  rule	  that	  would	  clarify	  the	  claims	  
process	  and	  establish	  a	  framework	  for	  the	  priority	  payment	  of	  creditors	  and	  
compensaSon	  recoupment	  from	  senior	  execuSves	  and	  directors	  of	  a	  failed	  SSFI	  	  
•  On	  July	  6,	  2011,	  the	  FDIC	  issued	  a	  ﬁnal	  rule	  implemenSng	  certain	  orderly	  
liquidaSon	  authority	  provisions	  of	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act.	  It	  follows	  and	  largely	  
coincides	  with	  the	  January	  18,	  2011	  interim	  ﬁnal	  rule	  and	  the	  March	  15,	  2011	  
proposed	  rule	  but	  also	  contains	  several	  key	  diﬀerences	  	  
•  In	  a	  May	  10,	  2012	  speech	  to	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  Chicago	  Bank	  Structure	  
Conference,	  acSng	  FDIC	  chairman	  MarSn	  J.	  Gruenberg	  detailed	  the	  FDIC's	  orderly	  
resoluSon	  strategy	  for	  SSFIs.	  The	  outlined	  orderly	  resoluSon	  strategy	  involves:	  	  
•  Placing	  the	  SSFI's	  parent	  company	  into	  receivership	  while	  leaving	  the	  subsidiaries	  
to	  conSnue	  operaSng	  as	  going-­‐concern	  counterparSes.	  	  
•  Transferring	  most	  of	  the	  SSFI's	  assets	  and	  some	  liabiliSes	  into	  a	  bridge	  company	  
that	  would	  undergo	  a	  debt-­‐for-­‐equity	  swap	  similar	  to	  a	  restructuring	  under	  
Chapter	  11	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code.	  	  
•  Eventually	  transferring	  ownership	  and	  control	  of	  the	  bridge	  holding	  company	  to	  
private	  hands.	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Who	  covers	  the	  cost	  of	  Resolu<on?	  (i)	  
•  Orderly	  Liquida<on	  Fund	  
•  To	  ﬁnance	  the	  FDIC's	  resoluSon	  of	  a	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company,	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act	  creates	  
a	  segregated	  fund	  at	  the	  Treasury	  Department	  (the	  Orderly	  LiquidaSon	  Fund).	  This	  fund	  is	  
not	  pre-­‐funded	  but	  the	  FDIC	  is	  authorized	  to	  borrow	  (by	  issuing	  bonds)	  from	  the	  US	  Treasury	  
the	  amount	  it	  needs	  to	  liquidate	  that	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company	  up	  a	  maximum	  equal	  to,	  in	  
the	  aggregate:	  
•  10%	  of	  the	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company's	  total	  consolidated	  assets	  during	  the	  ﬁrst	  30	  days	  
a(er	  the	  FDIC's	  appointment	  as	  receiver.	  
•  90%	  of	  the	  fair	  value	  of	  the	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company's	  total	  consolidated	  assets	  a(er	  the	  
ﬁrst	  30	  days.	  
•  Repaying	  the	  US	  Treasury	  
•  The	  Act	  provides	  that	  no	  taxpayer	  funds	  can	  be	  used	  to	  resolve	  a	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company.	  
Before	  the	  FDIC	  can	  borrow	  any	  money	  from	  the	  US	  Treasury	  to	  ﬁnance	  the	  liquidaSon	  of	  a	  
covered	  ﬁnancial	  company,	  it	  must	  enter	  into	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  Treasury	  Department	  
which:	  
•  Sets	  out	  a	  speciﬁc	  plan	  and	  schedule	  (which	  must	  be	  within	  60	  days)	  for	  repaying	  the	  amount	  
borrowed.	  
•  Demonstrates	  that	  the	  income	  earned	  from	  the	  liquidaSon	  of	  the	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company	  
(plus	  any	  assessments)	  will	  be	  suﬃcient	  to	  repay	  the	  loans	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  agreed	  
schedule.	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
Who	  covers	  the	  cost	  of	  Resolu<on?	  (ii)	  
•  Risk-­‐based	  Assessments	  
•  If	  the	  income	  that	  will	  be	  earned	  from	  liquidaSng	  the	  covered	  
ﬁnancial	  company's	  assets	  are	  insuﬃcient	  to	  repay	  to	  the	  US	  
Treasury	  the	  amounts	  borrowed	  to	  ﬁnance	  the	  liquidaSon,	  the	  FDIC	  
must	  impose	  assessments	  on	  claimants	  that	  received	  addiSonal	  
payments	  under	  the	  liquidaSon	  process.	  If	  that	  is	  sSll	  insuﬃcient,	  
the	  FDIC	  may	  impose	  assessments	  on	  eligible	  ﬁnancial	  companies	  
(deﬁned	  as	  systemically	  signiﬁcant	  ﬁnancial	  insStuSons	  and	  
ﬁnancial	  companies	  with	  total	  consolidated	  assets	  greater	  than	  $50	  
billion).	  These	  assessments	  are	  based	  on	  the	  risk	  and	  assets	  of	  the	  
companies	  including	  among,	  other	  things,	  the:	  
•  Risk	  these	  eligible	  ﬁnancial	  companies	  pose	  to	  the	  US	  ﬁnancial	  
system.	  
•  Extent	  to	  which	  they	  have	  beneﬁted	  or	  are	  likely	  to	  beneﬁt	  from	  
the	  orderly	  liquidaSon	  of	  the	  covered	  ﬁnancial	  company.	  
•  Amount,	  categories	  and	  concentraSon	  of	  a	  ﬁnancial	  company	  and	  
its	  aﬃliates'	  on	  and	  oﬀ-­‐balance	  sheet	  assets	  and	  liabiliSes.	  
•  AcSviSes	  and	  market	  share	  of	  these	  eligible	  companies.	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
Diﬀerences	  between	  the	  UK	  	  
and	  the	  US	  Bank	  Regula<on	  &	  Resolu<on	  Regimes	  
•  The	  UK	  does	  not	  have	  an	  explicit	  disSncSon	  between	  SIFI	  and	  non-­‐
SIFI	  supervision	  &	  resoluSon	  
•  In	  the	  US	  bank	  regulaSon	  has	  been	  formally	  &	  explicitly	  been	  
poliScized	  given	  the	  extensive	  powers	  of	  Treasury	  Secretary	  in	  
connecSon	  to	  SIFI	  designaSon	  and	  OLA	  
•  Although	  Title	  II	  was	  enacted	  to	  ensure	  the	  orderly	  liquidaSon	  of	  
companies	  that	  may	  have	  an	  adverse	  eﬀect	  on	  the	  US	  ﬁnancial	  
system,	  it	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  an	  opSon	  of	  last	  resort.	  	  
•  As	  a	  result,	  Title	  II	  contains	  many	  procedural	  hurdles,	  including	  the	  
requirement	  that	  several	  federal	  regulators	  determine	  that	  the	  
company	  poses	  a	  systemic	  risk	  to	  US	  ﬁnancial	  stability	  before	  the	  
FDIC	  can	  be	  appointed	  as	  the	  receiver	  of	  that	  company	  
•  The	  UK	  does	  not	  have	  a	  mandatory	  liquidaSon	  requirement	  for	  
SIFIs	  in	  resoluSon	  (nor	  does	  the	  EU	  framework)	  
•  BoE	  governor	  has	  become	  an	  uber-­‐regulator	  and	  uber-­‐economic	  
policy-­‐maker	  
•  Will	  it	  work?	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
	  
Cross-­‐	  border	  Resolu;on	  strategies	  
	  •  The	  Financial	  Services	  Act	  2010	  requires	  banks	  to	  submit	  recovery	  and	  resoluSon	  plans	  to	  the	  FSA	  (the	  PRA	  in	  future),	  which	  has	  to	  consult	  the	  Bank’s	  resoluSon	  team	  and	  HMT	  on	  this.	  The	  Key	  
A`ributes	  require	  resoluSon	  plans	  to	  be	  drawn	  up	  for	  G-­‐SIFIs	  by	  home	  and	  key	  host	  authoriSes	  
working	  together.	  Recently	  the	  FSB	  has	  issued	  a	  consultaSve	  document	  that,	  amongst	  other	  
things,	  sets	  out	  two	  broad	  types	  of	  resoluSon	  strategy	  (with	  a	  spectrum	  in-­‐between)	  
•  Single	  point	  of	  entry	  (SPE)	  resoluSon	  involves	  the	  applicaSon	  of	  resoluSon	  tools	  by	  the	  home	  
authority	  at	  the	  top	  of	  a	  G-­‐SIFI	  group	  to	  resolve	  problems	  in	  the	  group	  as	  a	  whole.	  
•  MulSple	  point	  of	  entry	  (MPE)	  resoluSon	  involves	  the	  applicaSon	  of	  resoluSon	  tools	  by	  a	  number	  
of	  home	  and	  host	  resoluSon	  authoriSes	  to	  mulSple	  companies	  in	  the	  group,	  with	  the	  overall	  plan	  
co-­‐ordinated	  by	  the	  home	  authority.	  	  
•  	  Which	  type	  of	  resoluSon	  strategy	  is	  be`er	  for	  a	  parScular	  group	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	  group,	  the	  nature	  of	  its	  business,	  and	  the	  size	  and	  locaSon	  of	  the	  group’s	  losses.	  For	  an	  “SPE”	  
resoluSon	  to	  be	  appropriate,	  loss-­‐absorbing	  instruments	  must	  have	  been	  issued	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  
group	  and	  be	  available	  to	  cover	  losses	  in	  the	  group’s	  subsidiaries.	  This	  is	  achieved	  by	  imposing	  
losses,	  for	  example	  through	  a	  bail-­‐in,	  on	  the	  external	  creditors	  of	  the	  parent	  holding	  company	  and	  
wriSng	  down	  the	  value	  of	  loans	  from	  the	  parent	  to	  its	  operaSng	  subsidiaries	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  
ensures	  those	  subsidiaries	  remain	  solvent	  and	  viable.	  For	  “MPE”	  to	  be	  appropriate,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  
feasible	  to	  separate	  the	  group	  ﬁnancially,	  operaSonally	  and	  legally	  along	  naSonal	  or	  regional	  
lines,	  and	  then	  for	  each	  distressed	  enSty	  to	  be	  resolved	  on	  a	  stand-­‐alone	  basis.	  The	  parts	  might	  be	  
resolved	  using	  bail-­‐in	  of	  external	  debt	  or	  other	  resoluSon	  techniques.	  	  
•  In	  either	  case,	  for	  bail-­‐in	  to	  be	  the	  chosen	  resoluSon	  tool	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  suﬃcient	  loss-­‐	  
absorbing	  capacity	  in	  the	  relevant	  legal	  enSSes.	  	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
US-­‐UK	  SPE	  MoU	  
•  In	  December	  2012	  the	  BoE	  and	  FED	  signed	  a	  MoU	  extending	  an	  SPE	  resoluSon	  strategy	  
to	  US	  and	  UK	  Bank	  holding	  companies	  
•  It	  provides	  resolu<on	  strategies	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  globally	  ac<ve,	  systemically	  
important,	  ﬁnancial	  ins<tu<ons	  (SIFIs	  or	  G-­‐SIFIs)	  with	  signiﬁcant	  operaSons	  on	  both	  
sides	  of	  the	  AtlanSc.	  
•  The	  goal	  is	  to	  produce	  resoluSon	  strategies	  that	  could	  be	  implemented	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  
one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  largest	  ﬁnancial	  insStuSons	  with	  extensive	  acSviSes	  in	  our	  
respecSve	  jurisdicSons.	  These	  resoluSon	  strategies	  should	  maintain	  systemically	  
important	  operaSons	  and	  contain	  threats	  to	  ﬁnancial	  stability.	  They	  should	  also	  assign	  
losses	  to	  shareholders	  and	  unsecured	  creditors	  in	  the	  group,	  thereby	  avoiding	  the	  
need	  for	  a	  bailout	  by	  taxpayers.	  
•  The	  joint	  US/UK	  resolu<on	  states	  that	  depositor	  haircuts	  are	  already	  legal	  in	  the	  UK	  
thanks	  to	  the	  2009	  UK	  Banking	  Act:	  
•  In	  the	  U.K.,	  the	  strategy	  has	  been	  developed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  powers	  provided	  by	  the	  
U.K.	  Banking	  Act	  2009	  and	  in	  anScipaSon	  of	  the	  further	  powers	  that	  will	  be	  provided	  by	  
the	  European	  Union	  Recovery	  and	  ResoluSon	  DirecSve	  and	  the	  domesSc	  reforms	  that	  
implement	  the	  recommendaSons	  of	  the	  U.K.	  Independent	  Commission	  on	  Banking.	  	  
Such	  a	  strategy	  would	  involve	  the	  bail-­‐in	  (write-­‐down	  or	  conversion)	  of	  creditors	  at	  
the	  top	  of	  the	  group	  in	  order	  to	  restore	  the	  whole	  group	  to	  solvency.	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
Looking	  into	  the	  future	  of	  the	  SPE	  (i)	  
•  ApplicaSon	  of	  SPE	  strategy	  can	  only	  be	  achieved	  within	  a	  legislaSve	  
framework	  that	  provides	  authoriSes	  with	  key	  resoluSon	  powers.	  	  
•  The	  FSB	  Key	  A`ributes	  have	  established	  a	  crucial	  framework	  for	  the	  
implementaSon	  of	  an	  eﬀecSve	  set	  of	  resoluSon	  powers	  and	  pracSces	  into	  
naSonal	  regimes.	  In	  the	  U.S.,	  these	  powers	  had	  already	  become	  available	  
under	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act.	  In	  the	  U.K.,	  the	  addiSonal	  powers	  needed	  to	  
enhance	  the	  exisSng	  resoluSon	  framework	  established	  under	  the	  Banking	  Act	  
2009(the	  Banking	  Act)	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  fully	  provided	  by	  the	  European	  
Commission’s	  proposals	  for	  a	  European	  Union	  Recovery	  and	  ResoluSon	  
DirecSve	  (RRD)	  and	  through	  the	  domesSc	  reforms	  that	  implement	  the	  
recommendaSons	  of	  the	  U.K.	  Independent	  Commission	  on	  Banking	  (ICB),	  
enhancing	  the	  exisSng	  resoluSon	  framework	  established	  under	  the	  Banking	  
Act.	  
•  Thus	  the	  development	  of	  SPE	  resoluSon	  strategies	  is	  being	  carried	  out	  in	  
anScipaSon	  of	  such	  legislaSon.	  
	  
	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	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Looking	  into	  the	  future	  of	  the	  SPE	  (ii)	  
•  Unsecured	  debt	  holders	  can	  expect	  that	  their	  claims	  
would	  be	  wrihen	  down	  to	  reﬂect	  any	  losses	  that	  
shareholders	  cannot	  cover,	  with	  some	  converted	  partly	  
into	  equity	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  suﬃcient	  capital	  to	  return	  
the	  sound	  businesses	  of	  the	  G-­‐SIFI	  to	  private	  sector	  
operaSon.	  	  
•  Sound	  subsidiaries	  (domesSc	  and	  foreign)	  would	  be	  kept	  
open	  and	  operaSng,	  thereby	  limiSng	  contagion	  eﬀects	  and	  
cross-­‐border	  complicaSons.	  In	  both	  countries,	  whether	  
during	  execuSon	  of	  the	  resoluSon	  or	  therea(er,	  
restructuring	  measures	  may	  be	  taken,	  especially	  in	  the	  
parts	  of	  the	  business	  causing	  the	  distress,	  including	  
shrinking	  those	  businesses,	  breaking	  them	  into	  smaller	  
enSSes,	  and/or	  liquidaSng	  or	  closing	  certain	  operaSons.	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  2013	  
Public/private	  law	  conﬂict	  in	  resolu<on	  
•  The	  threat	  of	  corporate	  insolvency	  is	  usually	  regarded	  
as	  a	  necessary	  ingredient	  of	  free	  markets,	  which	  
means	  that	  government	  intervenSons	  are	  excepSonal.	  
Whilst	  most	  countries	  have	  schemes	  that	  look	  a(er	  
depositors	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  bank	  insolvency,	  and	  most	  
central	  banks	  use	  their	  powers	  as	  lender	  of	  last	  resort	  
to	  give	  short-­‐term	  assistance	  to	  fundamentally	  sound	  
banks,	  the	  present	  economic	  crisis	  has	  occasioned	  
more	  drasSc	  government	  intervenSons.	  These	  include	  
the	  installaSon	  of	  government	  managers	  into	  a	  
troubled	  bank	  and	  government-­‐subsidised	  takeovers	  
by	  otherwise	  unwilling	  private	  sector	  purchasers.	  Such	  
intervenSons	  raise	  serious	  issues	  
Emilios	  Avgouleas,	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The	  character	  of	  Resolu<on	  Laws	  
•  UK	  &	  US	  Banking	  legislaSon	  is	  transferring	  to	  
government	  authoriSes	  huge	  powers	  to	  decide	  the	  
future	  of	  any	  bank	  that	  looks	  like	  wobbling;	  this	  
includes	  power	  to	  make	  subordinate	  legislaSon	  that	  
overrides	  private	  property	  and	  contractual	  rights,	  
that	  overrides	  other	  statutes,	  and	  that	  can	  even	  be	  
retrospecSve.	  In	  eﬀect,	  this	  legislaSve	  acSvity	  
decides	  nothing,	  but	  delegates	  all	  decisional	  powers	  
to	  government.	  Emergency	  legislaSon	  has	  always	  
been	  like	  that.	  	  
•  This	  all	  reminds	  us	  of	  laws	  passed	  during	  the	  Great	  
depression	  (See	  Mark	  Aronson,	  ‘The	  Great	  
Depression,	  this	  Depression,	  and	  AdministraSve	  
Law’166	  Federal	  Law	  Review,	  Volume	  37	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Unresolved	  Issues	  
•  Deﬁni<on	  of	  bank	  &	  regulatory	  perimeter	  
•  It	  has	  never	  been	  an	  easy	  task	  to	  deﬁne	  what	  us	  a	  bank	  
under	  the	  law.	  A	  previous	  ediSon	  of	  this	  book	  oﬀered	  a	  
deﬁniSon	  based	  on	  the	  wording	  of	  legal	  texts	  and	  placed	  
emphasis	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  bank	  accepts	  deposits.	  
However,	  a	  number	  of	  other	  funcSons	  were	  not	  caught	  as	  
there	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  realm	  of	  insStuSons	  that	  
are	  were	  not	  classiﬁed	  as	  banks.	  Yet	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  
today’s	  banking	  leaves	  li`le	  room	  for	  similarly	  neat	  
approaches.	  	  
•  [Therefore,	  it	  may	  be	  expected	  that	  future	  legal	  deﬁniSons	  
of	  what	  is	  a	  bank	  will	  retain	  maturity	  transformaSon	  
deposit	  taking	  and	  lending	  at	  the	  core	  of	  bank	  acSvity	  will	  
also	  make	  reference	  to	  other	  characterisScs	  such	  as	  
eligibility	  for	  central	  bank	  liquidity	  support,	  and	  provision	  
of	  essenSal	  infrastructure	  services	  to	  retail	  and	  wholesale	  
customers,	  especially	  payments.	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Conclusions	  (i)	  
•  Financial	  stability	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  the	  right	  insStuSons	  
•  •	  In	  building	  those	  insStuSons	  general	  law	  
might	  have	  to	  be	  amended/reformed	  or	  just	  
ignored	  
•  	  E.g.,	  banks	  require	  special	  insolvency	  laws	  
which	  not	  only	  bypass	  general	  insolvency	  law	  
but	  also	  ignore	  shareholder	  rights	  grounded	  in	  
general	  company	  law	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Conclusions	  (ii)	  
•  Private	  Ordering	  of	  Public	  markets	  (	  a	  <me	  old	  
problem	  –	  e.g.,	  CRAs,	  self-­‐regula<on)	  is	  rapidly	  
receding	  
•  	  the	  public-­‐private	  partnership	  in	  producSon	  of	  
regulaSon	  and	  its	  enforcement	  (regulatory	  enrolment)	  
as	  well	  its	  derivaSve	  risk-­‐based	  regulaSon	  are	  equally	  
on	  the	  wane	  
•  Public	  law	  and	  regulators	  are	  greatly	  encroaching	  in	  
areas	  that	  were	  largely	  the	  realm	  of	  private	  law	  
•  Excessive	  regulatory	  power	  
•  At	  the	  same	  Sme,	  the	  burden	  on	  regulators	  is	  beyond	  
excessive	  and	  it’s	  interesSng	  to	  see	  if	  they	  manage	  to	  
successfully	  discharge	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  newly	  conferred	  
du<es	  	  
•  Regulatory	  accountability	  remains	  a	  ‘black	  box’	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